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Pursuant to Rule 24(g) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Defendants/
Appellants, Mary Sawyers and KTVX-TV, hereby respectfully submit their
Reply/Answer Brief.
I. DR. JENSEN'S REQUEST FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE
IS UNWARRANTED
In his appellee's brief, Dr. Jensen attempts to distract the Court with
mischaracterizations of the issues and unsupported claims that appellants have failed to
adequately marshal the evidence supporting the verdicts. As demonstrated below, the
appellants have raised three issues that require the Court to decide pure questions of law:
(1) whether the trial court erred in applying the "catch-all" tort statute of limitations to
claims for libel (that plaintiff had merely re-labeled claims for "false light invasion of
privacy"), and thereby permitted the plaintiff to circumvent the statute of limitations for
libel;1 (2) whether plaintiffs statutory and common law intrusion claims are legally
insufficient for failure of plaintiff to show violation of any expectation of privacy that is
objectively reasonable, and (3) whether plaintiffs "false light" invasion of privacy claim

Dr. Jensen also asserts that a trial court's denial of a summary judgment motion
is not reviewable on appeal after a trial. Corrected Br. of Appellee at 24-25. Although
Dr. Jensen cites numerous authorities from outside this jurisdiction, his counsel
apparently neglected to review the authorities cited in the appellant's opening brief. See
Snow v. Rudd, 998 P.2d 262 (Utah 2000) (reversing trial court's denial of motion for
summary judgment on issue of statute of limitations on appeal after completion of jury
trial). The issue is moot in any event, since the same record that was made on the motion
for summary judgment was also made at trial. Opening Br. 1-2.
Dr. Jensen concedes that "most jurisdictions require the court to make an initial
determination that the [plaintiffs] expectation of seclusion or solitude is 'objectively
reasonable.'" Corrected Appellee's Br. at 30 n.9.

1

fails for the same reason. Because three of the six questions presented by this appeal
require this Court to resolve pure questions of law, there is no basis for affirmance on
grounds of failure to marshal the evidence.
Defendants have also raised three issues that do call upon the Court to assess the
sufficiency of the evidence in support of the jury verdicts: (1) the defendants' broadcasts
are "substantially true" and therefore not actionable as libel or false light publicity,
(2) there is no competent evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff suffered any economic
losses that were proximately caused by the allegedly false statements contained in the
defendants' third broadcast, and (3) there is no clear and convincing evidence of "actual
malice" necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages, and As to each of these
issues the defendants readily concede that they bear the burden of marshalling the
evidence in support of the verdicts below. However, as demonstrated in the remainder of
this brief, the plaintiffs Response does not point to any material evidence in support of
any of these verdicts that was not cited by the defendants in their Opening Brief.
II. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS GOVERNING LIBEL CLAIMS
MUST APPLY TO ALL LIBEL CLAIMS
THAT ARE SIMPLY RE-LABELED "FALSE LIGHT"
Dr. Jensen asserts that the "catch-all" statute of limitations for "torts having
nowhere else been provided for in this statute" should apply to his re-labeled libel claims.
Corrected Appellee's Br. at 5. Dr. Jensen does not (and cannot) dispute that it was not
until after the defendants moved to dismiss his libel claims on the first two broadcasts as
untimely filed that he filed an Amended Complaint that simply re-labeled those claims
"false light invasion of privacy." See Opening Br. at 5, 25. Ignoring this Court's
2

footnote in Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 906 n.37 (Utah 1992),
which stated that "a false light invasion of privacy claim based on defamatory statements
[is] governed by the statute of limitations for libel," Dr. Jensen cites authorities
(including unreported decisions) from other jurisdictions that have applied a longer
statute of limitations to an invasion of privacy claim.3 Corrected Appellee's Br. at 26.
Of course, none of the still valid cases he has cited are binding on this Court, and the
Court should adhere to the rule it embraced in Russell, supra. Moreover, were the Court
to indulge Dr. Jensen's legerdemain in relabeling a "libel claim" as one for "false light"
here - in a case that pertains to his business and professional conduct and reputation
(from which claims for emotional distress are derivative) and not his private life affairs that would send a clear signal to all future plaintiffs that the Utah statute of limitations for
libel is meaningless. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broad. Co., 709 S.W.2d 475, 480 (Mo.
1986) (under facts remarkably similar to those of the present case, the Court noted that "if
the defamation statute of limitations is not applied, such a statute would become
meaningless because parties will invariably claim a 'false light' invasion of privacy
instead of a defamation.").

3

Indeed, the two Kansas authorities cited by Dr. Jensen have been disavowed by
Kansas' Court of Appeals. See Meyer Land & Cattle Co. v. Lincoln Cty. Conservation
Dist, 31 P.3d 970, 974-75 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that false light invasion of
privacy claim, as well as all other "misrepresentation-based claims" that arise from the
same publication "are essentially allegations of defamation, and all are similarly timebarred" under the one-year statute of limitations for defamation). Similarly, the
unreported United States District Court for the District of Oregon decision Dr. Jensen
cites has also been rejected by Oregon's Court of Appeals. See Magenis v. Fisher
Broad., Inc., 798 P.2d 1106, 1109 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).

3

Dr. Jensen argues that the Court of Appeals' analysis in Hodges v. Howell, 4 P.3d
803 (Utah Ct. App. 2000), is dispositive. Dr. Jensen's reliance upon Hodges is
completely misplaced. In Hodges, the Court of Appeals concluded that the elements and
"basic nature of the alleged violation of the plaintiffs right" of a claim for alienation of
affections are "not sufficiently related" to the elements and basic nature of the alleged
violation of the plaintiffs right in a claim for seduction that the statute of limitations for
seduction should govern both actions. Id. at 806-07. The Court of Appeals concluded
that comparing the claims of "alienation of affection" and "seduction" was akin to
comparing apples and oranges: "Indeed, the two torts do not even share an identity of
plaintiffs and defendants." Id. at 806.
Here, even though the two causes of action that Dr. Jensen sequentially pleaded
(based upon the identical set of facts) are at least nominally distinct legal claims, they
cannot be characterized as "not sufficiently related" to have the same statute of
limitations apply.4 Where, as here, both claims are based upon the purported falsity of
statements concerning the plaintiffs business and professional conduct and not his
personal or private affairs, the distinction between the two is entirely ephemeral. While it
is true that this Court has recognized "false light" and "libel" as distinct causes of action,
that fact alone does not resolve the issue of which statute of limitations should apply.
When the Tennessee Supreme Court, like this Court, recognized "false light invasion of

Indeed, Colorado's Supreme Court recently decided that the claims of false light
and libel were so closely related that there was no need to recognize a separate claim for
false light under that state's common law. See Denver Publ g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893
(Colo. 2002).
4

privacy" as a cognizable claim independent of the claim for libel, it determined that the
two claims were sufficiently related to one another that "application of different statutes
of limitation for false light and defamation cases could undermine the effectiveness of
limitation on defamation claims." West v. Media General Convergence, 53 S.W.3d 640,
648 (Tenn. 2001); see also authorities cited in Opening Br. at 24-25. Notably, the
authoritative RESTATEMENT OF TORTS states that a plaintiff asserting both libel and false
light claims premised on the same publication is entitled to recover on only one of the
two closely related claims, not both. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 652E cmt. b
(1977).
A much more analogous case to the present one than Hodges is this Court's
decision in Tollman v. K-Mart Enters, of Utah, Inc., 560 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1977), which is
cited by the Court of Appeals in Hodges. In Tollman, this Court held that the same
statute of limitations at issue in this case, § 78-12-29(4), applied to a claim for "false
arrest," even though "false arrest" is not among the tort claims listed in the statute. This
Court concluded that the claim of "false imprisonment," which is contained in the statute,
is sufficiently related in nature to the claim of "false arrest" that the one-year statute of
limitations should apply: "Variance in nomenclature does not change the essential nature
of the wrong." 560 P.2d at 1128. Thus, to determine the appropriate statute of
limitations, the Court must look "to the basic nature of the alleged violation of the
plaintiffs right" irrespective of what label a plaintiff attaches to his claim. Most
tellingly, for purposes of deciding the present controversy, the Court recognized "the fact
that Sec. 78-12-29(4) U.C.A

appears to cover [all of] the various invasions of
5

personal liberty." Id. In words that apply equally well to the present case, the Court
concluded "it would be quite illogical to suppose that all other invasions of personal
liberty were limited to one year by that Section, but there was a separate, but
unmentioned, tort of 'false arrest' which should have a four-year statute of limitations
governed by the 'catch-all5 Section 78-12-25(2) U.C.A." Id. Accordingly, under this
Court's own precedent of Tollman and the numerous authorities set forth in appellants'
Opening Brief at 24-25, the Court must find that the one-year statute of limitations
applies to Dr. Jensen's untimely libel claims that he merely re-labeled as claims for "false
light."
III. DR. JENSEN HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED
HE HAD AN OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
IN THE CONDUCT OF HIS PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES
At page 28 of his Corrected Appellee's Brief, Dr. Jensen asserts that there are four
prongs to an intrusion claim.5 Dr. Jensen claims all of these issues present questions of
fact for the jury, but he is plainly mistaken: Prong 3 "whether Dr. Jensen had a
reasonable expectation of privacy as a state-licensed and regulated physician" (which is
essentially the same question posed by prong 1), presents a question of law for the court.
See infra at 7-11. In fact, the question presented in prong 3 is the only issue the Court
needs to resolve in order to reverse all of Dr. Jensen's claims labeled "invasion of
privacy," whether common law intrusion, statutory violations (which require
unauthorized recording "in a private place"), or false light "invasion of privacy." For all

His prong 4 concerns substantial truth, which is a defense to defamation and
false light, but plays no role in a claim for intrusion.

6

such claims, the threshold question - one of law for the court to decide - is whether Dr.
Jensen had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his conduct of his
professionally licensed medical care rendered in the confines of a commercial business
establishment. If this Court answers that question in the negative, as defendants maintain
it should, then none of Dr. Jensen's claims for violation of his right to privacy can be
sustained.
It is well settled that the tort of intrusion upon solitude or seclusion requires an
intentional invasion into an aspect of the plaintiffs personal life in which he has both a
subjective and an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. See Medical Lab.
Mgmt. Consultants v. American Broad. Co., 306 F.3d 806, 812-13 (9th Cir. 2002)
(citations omitted); see also Corrected Appellee's Br. at 30 n.9; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
TORTS § 652B cmt. c at 379; W. Page Keeton, et al, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, §
117 at 855 (5th ed. 1984) ("[T]he thing into which there is an intrusion or prying must be,
and be entitled to be, private.") (emphasis added). It is equally well settled that the
question whether a person's expectation of privacy in a particular set of circumstance was
an objectively reasonable one is a question of law, for the court. See, e.g., Opening Br.
26-28 (citing authorities); see also State v. Shreve, 667 P.2d 590, 591 (Utah 1983) {per
curiam).
Dr. Jensen's reliance upon Sanders v. American Broadcasting Company is
unavailing because Utah's statutes, unlike California's, do not require all parties to
consent to the recording of a conversation. See Medical Lab. Mgmt. Consultants, 306
F.3d at 815-16 (expressly distinguishing Sanders and Shulman decisions because
7

California's Invasion of Privacy Act prohibits electronic recording of any "confidential
communication" without the consent of all parties to the communication). Utah's law,
like Arizona's law at issue in the Medical Lab, Consultants case, "reflects a policy
decision by the state that the secret recording of a private conversation by a party to that
conversation does not violate another party's right to privacy." Id, at 816. More
tellingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that even if it assumed Arizona would follow
California's unique approach to recognizing "limited privacy" (which protects against
unconsented recording of one's conversation), it would not find a violation in cases such
as Dr. Jensen's interaction with Mary Sawyers, in which no personal and intimate
details of Dr. Jensen's life were recorded by the defendants: "Protection for privacy
interests generally apply only to private matters." Id, at 816 (citation omitted)6; see also
Wilkins v. National Broad, Co,, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 332 (Ct. App. 1999) (affirming
summary judgment for defendants on intrusion claim premised upon surreptitious
recording of a meeting where recorded conversation did not capture any of the plaintiffs'
"personal lives, intimate relationships, or any other private affairs"); Desnick v. American
Broad, Co,, 44 F.3d 1345, 1352-53 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming summary judgment for
media defendants on intrusion claim where undercover reporters "videotaped physicians
engaged in professional, not personal communications with strangers (the testers
6

See also W. Page Keeton, et al., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, § 117 at 854
(intrusion requires "intentional interference with another's . . . private affairs and
concerns.") (emphasis added); Sullivan v, Pulitzer Broad, Co,, 709 S.W.2d 475, 481 (Mo.
1986) (Blackmar, J., concurring) (in a false light case, where allegations concerning the
plaintiff "are proper matters of public concern, [they are charges] to which the plaintiff
has no right to privacy.").
8

themselves),... there was no eavesdropping on a private conversation; the testers
recorded their own conversations with the Desnick Eye Center's physicians.").
Similarly, Dr. Jensen's reliance upon the Dietemann and Copeland decisions is
unavailing because both cases involved surreptitious recording inside the uniquely private
setting of the plaintiffs' homes, not while plaintiffs (as here) were rendering stateo

licensed professional services in a commercial business office setting. See Desnick, 44
F.3d at 1352-53 (distinguishing Dietemann from case where undercover reporters
surreptitiously recorded licensed doctors' professional interactions in a commercial office
setting). Dr. Jensen's attempt to distinguish two cases cited by the defendants is also
unavailing: (1) Dr. Jensen brushes aside Washington Post v. United States Dep 't of
Justice, 863 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1988), as a supposedly inapposite FOIA case. Of course,
Exemption (7)(C) of the FOIA authorizes nondisclosure of information which would
constitute "an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Courts interpreting that
language have held that it does not apply to "information relating to business judgments
and relationships .. . even if disclosure might tarnish someone's professional reputation."
Id. at 100. (2) Dr. Jensen dismisses New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), as a
purportedly inapposite Fourth Amendment case. Of course, for there to be a violation of
Shulman and Sanders are also distinguishable because in both cases the
defendants recorded intimate details of the plaintiffs' personal and private lives.
Cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (recognizing clear distinction
between expectations of privacy outside and inside one's home: "In the home, our cases
show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying . . .
eyes.").

9

one's Fourth Amendment rights through a warrantless search, the court must also find (as
in an intrusion claim) that the plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy in the areas searched. See State v. Shreve, 667 P.2d 590, 591 (Utah 1983) (per
curiam); see also Forster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146, 1149 (9 Cir.
1990) (holding that plaintiff doctor had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
medical treatment of undercover patients who recorded their interaction with the
plaintiff).
Most tellingly (in fact, dispositively), Dr. Jensen devotes none of his response
brief to attempting to distinguish or explain the four pivotal cases of (1) Desnick, (2)
Medical Labs Consultants, (3) Forster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146 (9
Cir. 1990), and (4) Commonwealth v. Alexander, 708 A.2d 1251 (Pa. 1998), each of
which holds that professionally licensed doctors have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the conduct of their professional medical care conducted in the confines of
commercial business settings. In all four of these factually indistinguishable cases, the
courts found no violation of any objectively reasonable expectation of privacy when third
parties (posing as patients) surreptitiously recorded licensed physicians' professional
interactions with them. Dr. Jensen only mentions, but does not address Medical Labs.
Consultants', the other three cases are not even cited in Dr. Jensen's 50-page brief. Dr.
Jensen's failure to even acknowledge these persuasive leading precedents betrays his

9

See also 2 Dobbs, Law of Torts § 426 at 1201 (2002) (noting that conduct of
private parties that constitutes tort of intrusion can constitute Fourth Amendment
violation when committed by governmental actors).
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inability to refute the weight of those authorities, which show as a matter of law that a
state-licensed medical professional has no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy11
in providing professional medical services to patients within a business establishment.
Accordingly, none of Dr. Jensen's claims for "invasion of privacy" (including intrusion
and false light "invasion of privacy"12) can, as a matter of law, be sustained.
IV. THE ALLEGED FALSITY OR "FICTIONALIZATION"
OF DEFENDANTS' BROADCAST CANNOT, BY ITSELF,
CONSTITUTE AN "INVASION OF PRIVACY"
IF THE BROADCASTS FOCUS EXCLUSIVELY
ON PLAINTIFF'S BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Dr. Jensen cites Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), to support his assertion
that a medical professional has a claim for "invasion of privacy" premised on a report
focused exclusively on his professional conduct, "when the reported material contains
falsehoods." Corrected Appellee's Br. at 32. However, Time, Inc. v. Hill is not a case
involving the "false light invasion of privacy" tort; the case arose under New York's civil
rights statutes §§ 50, 51, which authorizes recovery for an unauthorized exploitation of an
individual's commercially marketable public persona. See Messenger v. Gruner & Jahr
Printing, 94 N.Y.2d 436, 441 (2000) ("[R]ecognizing the legislature's pointed objective
10

Of course, Dr. Jensen cannot now address those cases in his Reply Brief in
support of his cross-appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 24(g).
To be objectively reasonable, an expectation of privacy must be "one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." State v. Shreve, 667 P.2d at 591.
"In order to be actionable, an action for false light [invasion of privacy] must
involve the private affairs of the subject, and cannot relate to any matter which is
inherently 'public' or 'of legitimate interest to the public.'" 62A AM. JUR. 2D, Privacy

11

in enacting sections 50 and 51, we have underscored that the statute is to be narrowly
construed and 'strictly limited5 to the non-consensual commercial appropriations of the
name, portrait or picture of a living person.") (citing Finger v. Omni Pubis. Int'l, 77
N.Y.2d 128, 141 (1990)); see also Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 125
(1993); Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 440 (1982) (stating that New
York's statute and common law do not recognize a claim for "false light invasion of
privacy"). In essence, the claim at issue under New York law in Time, Inc. v. Hill is
accurately described as one for "misappropriation of a plaintiff s name, persona, image,
or likeness for commercial advantage," which the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION

correctly recognizes as a commercial tort, not an invasion of

personal privacy. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1994).
Dr. Jensen did not (and cannot) claim that the defendants improperly misappropriated his
name, persona, image, or likeness for their commercial advantage; instead, he pleaded a
claim for the invasion of his personal privacy. Thus, Dr. Jensen's argument simply
ignores the long line of cases cited in Appellant's Opening Brief at 26-28, 34-36 that hold
that certain aspects of a plaintiff s life - e.g., one's discharge of his official or
professional duties - cannot, as a matter of law, give rise to a claim for "invasion of
privacy" irrespective of the truth of falsity of the broadcast. Accordingly, Dr. Jensen's
"invasion of privacy" (false light) claims must fail, as a matter of law.

§ 126 at 734-35. See Russell, 842 P.2d at 902 ("Allegations of misconduct against a local
doctor . . . are certainly matters of public concern....").

12

V. DR. JENSEN HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE
THAT THE DEFENDANTS5 PUBLISHED STATEMENTS
ARE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
Dr. Jensen is correct that the question whether allegedly defamatory statements are
substantially true is generally a jury question, but it is also a question that the defendants
argued in their motions for summary judgment, for a directed verdict, and for JNOV. See
Opening Br. at 2. This Court therefore reviews those rulings for correctness (of course,
while looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Furthermore,
the Court must determine whether the published statements were substantially true by
exercising the Court's own "independent appellate review." Opening Br. at 2-3. On this
issue, Dr. Jensen's primary response is his claim that the defendants failed to sufficiently
marshal the evidence in support of the jury's verdict. Corrected Appellee's Br. at 22-24.
Not only is this assertion without merit,13 Dr. Jensen has himself failed to acknowledge or
respond to the evidence cited in the Appellants' Opening Brief that demonstrates the

Dr. Jensen's assertion that the defendants/appellants failed to cite numerous
facts in support of the falsity of published statements concerning his treatment of Mary
Sawyers is demonstrably erroneous. The appellants did cite to the evidence that Dr.
Jensen claims is relevant: (a) Jensen believed, based on Sawyers' alleged representation
to his receptionist, that she was desperate to lose weight or she would lose her job,
Opening Br. at 9 n.2; (b) Jensen's medical assistant did take Sawyers' blood pressure and
recorded it on an intake form, id. at 11, 20; (c) Sawyers filled out a medical history form
prior to meeting with Dr. Jensen, id. at 11 n.4, 47; (d) during her office visit with him, Dr.
Jensen indicated that "maybe" he'd prescribe Dexedrine if Fen-Phen did not work out of
her, id. at 12, 46; (e) that Dr. Jensen claimed at trial that he intended to conduct a
thorough physical examination of Ms. Sawyers but was prohibited from doing so when
she abruptly left the examination room, id. at 12, 47; (f) that prior to the defendants' first
broadcast, Dr. Jensen told Sawyers he had reconsidered his earlier statements in which he
had indicated a willingness to prescribe Dexedrine for weight loss, id. at 15-16, 46, 49;
(g) the second broadcast stated that DOPL was "going after" Jensen's license, id. at 49.

13

substantial truth of the gist of the defendants' broadcast - that Dr. Jensen prescribed
controlled substance weight loss medications ("Fen-Phen") to patients without first
conducting any meaningful physical examination or medical history as required by state
law. Once again, what is most telling about Dr. Jensen's brief is that he has completely
ignored the undisputed facts cited in the appellants' brief: that on the same day that Dr.
Jensen wrote out the Fen-Phen prescription for Mary Sawyers, he also wrote the same
prescription for his nurse practitioner Sandra Peterson-Katour without conducting any
physical examination or obtaining any medical history from her. See Opening Br. at 14. H
Thus, the question raised on appeal is whether these undisputed facts - that Dr. Jensen
prescribed controlled substances to Peterson-Katour without performing a medical
examination of any kind - renders the defendants' published statements concerning his
similar conduct with Mary Sawyers substantially true. See Opening Br. at 38-40. By not
disputing that this incident occurred, nor contending that it differed in any material way
from what was depicted in the broadcast, Dr. Jensen effectively concedes that the gist of
the defendants' broadcast - that on one occasion he prescribed controlled substances for
weight loss without conducting legally adequate medical evaluations - was substantially
true.

Dr. Jensen did not dispute these facts, but only disputed Peterson's further
testimony that at that same time, Jensen also gave her a second Fen-Phen prescription for
Peterson's mother, without ever seeing her or knowing anything about her health or
medical history. R. 6867 (Katour) at 18-19, 23-24; R. 6856 (Jensen) at 18.

14

VI. DR. JENSEN HAS FAILED TO (AND CANNOT) POINT TO ANY
EVIDENCE PROVING THAT HE SUFFERED ECONOMIC LOSSES
THAT WERE PROXIMATELY CAUSED
BY THE DEFENDANTS9 THIRD BROADCAST
Once again, Dr. Jensen derides the defendants for allegedly having failed to
marshal the evidence in support of economic losses he claims were proximately caused
by the defendants' third broadcast. Corrected Appellee's Brief at 38 -39. However, Dr.
Jensen is unable, either in this section of his brief or in his statement of facts, to point to
any record evidence demonstrating he suffered any economic losses as a proximate result
of the defendants' third broadcast. Instead, Dr. Jensen points only to his own bald and
unsupported claim, during his own testimony at trial, that he was "financially damaged
by these broadcasts." See R. 6866 (Jensen) at 104.15 Defendants can hardly be faulted
for having omitted such a hollow and unsupported assertion - without any demonstrable
proof offered in support of that assertion - as a failure to "marshal the evidence" that
would support of the jury's verdict.
Dr. Jensen also cites to his own unsupported assertion at trial that he unilaterally
quit his job at the Art City Family Medical Center because "he understood that his
employer cut back his hours and would fire him." Corrected Appellee's Br. at 40
(emphasis added). However, Dr. Jensen did not present any evidence at trial
demonstrating that his own "understanding" that he'd be fired if he did not quit his job

During his testimony, Dr. Jensen also claimed that he was "incredibly injured"
by all three broadcasts. See R. 6866 (Jensen) at 118-19. But even this unsupported
conclusory assertion does not even claim, much less prove, that he suffered any financial
losses as a result of any of the broadcasts.
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was well-founded or that any of his superiors ever informed him that he was to be
terminated16 (or, most importantly, that any such alleged employment decision was
triggered by the defendants' third broadcast). Indeed, Dr. Jensen testified that it was his
"understanding" that he'd be fired only "if the newscasts continued" in the future, after
the third broadcast, and not as a result of it. See R. 6866 (Jensen) at 98: 14-16.
Moreover, the director of that clinic, Michael Rosen, testified that the management of that
clinic had specifically decided not to terminate Dr. Jensen after the first of the
defendants' broadcasts (which was the only time any of Dr. Jensen's patients expressed
an unwillingness to be treated by him). R. 6848 (Rosen) at 88: 4-12. And Rosen testified
that Dr. Jensen's employment at the clinic ended solely as a result of Dr. Jensen's own
voluntary action. Id. at 118:1-6. Thus, Dr. Jensen did not offer any competent evidence
demonstrating that any adverse employment action that he claims he expected to be taken
against him was attributable to his employer's response to the defendants' third
broadcast. In other words, the "proof he points to is, in reality, no proof at all, but pure
speculation and conjecture on his part. See Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray &
Thurman, 584 P.2d 894, 896 (Utah 1978) (award of damages "cannot properly be based
on speculation and conjecture" . . . the plaintiff must establish, through competent
evidence, that he "suffered injury and damage and also that it was proximately caused by
the negligence of the defendant"); Gould v. Mountain States Tel & Tel. Co., 309 P.2d

16

Indeed, Dr. Jensen corrected himself to make clear he was not so notified, when
he began his statement "They told me - or it was my understanding . . . " R. 6866
(Jensen) at 98: 15.

16

802, 806 (Utah 1957) ("The award for loss of prospective profits by the jury on the
present state of proof is clearly the result of speculation and conjecture.").
Dr. Jensen also points to his testimony that on one occasion a single lady patient
was waiting to see him, recognized him, and said "I will not see Dr. Jensen." R. 6866
(Jensen) at 43. What Dr. Jensen omits from his brief is the fact that this single instance of
a "lost customer" occurred shortly after (and as a result of) the defendants' first
broadcast, long before the third story was broadcast. R. 6866 (Jensen) at 43: 16-17
17

(indicating that the incident occurred "within the first month after the first broadcast").
Thus, as a matter of law, Dr. Jensen did not present any evidence of economic losses he
suffered that were proximately caused by the defendants' third broadcast. See Gould,
309 P.2d at 806 ("Plaintiff has not shown a single instance of the loss of prospective
business caused by the defendant's breach, and any award for loss of prospective profits
must necessarily be based upon speculation and conjecture.") (emphasis added).
Finally, Dr. Jensen asserts that two of his expert witnesses on damages, Dr. Frank
Stuart and L. Deane Smith, both testified as to the amount of economic losses that Dr.
Jensen suffered as a result of the defendants' broadcasts. See Corrected Appellee's Br. at
40. In fact, both of these witnesses testified that Dr. Jensen's economic losses all flowed
from his loss of coverage by IHC health plans, which occurred in September 1995, more
than one full year prior to the defendants' third broadcasts. See Appellants' Opening Br.
In his brief, Dr. Jensen erroneously asserts that the incident occurred "after the
third broadcast." Corrected Appellee's Br. at 40. Dr. Jensen also testified that a similar
incident had occurred "directly after the second broadcast," R. 6866 at 44: 18-21, but
never offered any evidence of lost patients resulting from the third broadcast.
17

at 40-42 (summarizing and providing record citations for Stuart's and Smith's trial
testimony). In his Response Brief, Dr. Jensen does not cite to any testimony from these
witnesses (or any other witnesses) purporting to establish a causal link between the
defendants' third broadcast and any economic losses thereafter purportedly suffered by
Dr. Jensen.
In sum, it is clear that the defendants met their burden of attempting to marshal
any and all evidence in support of the verdict. Moreover, in his Response Brief, Dr.
Jensen has failed to meet his burden of citing any evidence in the record that actually
demonstrated that defendants' third broadcast was the proximate cause of economic
losses he suffered thereafter. Accordingly, the Court must vacate the jury's award of
$ 1,000,000 in economic damages that were premised upon the third broadcast.
VII. DR. JENSEN HAS NOT POINTED TO ANY EVIDENCE
THAT WOULD PERMIT THIS COURT
TO FIND CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF
THAT DEFENDANTS PUBLISHED WITH ACTUAL MALICE18
Dr. Jensen erroneously asserts that only common law malice is required for
punitive damages. See Corrected Appellee's Br. at 43. Here, Dr. Jensen confuses the
standard of fault for liability in a private figure case (which is negligence), and the
standard of fault required to impose punitive damages upon a media defendant in a
private figure case where the publication is on a matter of public concern. See MUJI
Inexplicably, Dr. Jensen devotes two pages of his brief to argue that neither the
public interest nor fair reports privilege applies to the defendants' broadcasts. See
Corrected Appellee's Br. at 41-42. However, the Court will search in vain the
defendants' Opening Brief for any argument by appellants asserting those privileges on
appeal.

18

10.12 (requiring constitutional "actual malice" for imposition of punitive damages); see
also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., All U.S. 749, 756 (1985). Not only does Dr. Jensen
erroneously urge that only common law malice need be established to sustain an award of
punitive damages, he fails to cite any record evidence that would sustain a finding (by the
requisite "clear and convincing evidence" standard) of actual malice; instead, Dr. Jensen
merely states that "the jury found that the evidence satisfied the high public official
standard for malice," and then argues that "defendants cannot justify their malice by facts
learned after their actions." Corrected Appellee's Br. at 44.19 Dr. Jensen's cavalier
reliance upon the jury's verdict on the question of actual malice ignores binding authority
from the United States Supreme Court holding that the First Amendment requires
appellate courts to exercise "independent appellate review" of the evidence of actual
malice. See Opening Br. at 44 (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc.,
466 U.S. 485, 510 (1984); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964)).
Here, as demonstrated by the extensive recitation of the record evidence, see Opening Br.

19

Dr. Jensen confuses the reason why defendants have cited to the undisputed
testimony that he prescribed Fen-Phen to Sandra Peterson-Katour without conducting any
medical examination or medical history. These undisputed facts, although learned by the
defendants after the broadcasts at issue, are not offered to justify the defendants' state of
mind at the time of the broadcast, but to demonstrate that the allegations in the broadcasts
were substantially true. See Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1228 (7th Cir.
1993) (holding that truthful publications are not actionable, "[a]nd it makes no difference
that the true facts were unknown until the trial").
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at 44-37, the record compels the Court's independent conclusion that there was not
clear and convincing evidence presented below establishing that the defendants published
their broadcasts knowing them to be false or while entertaining serious subjective doubts
as to their truth.
VIIL ANSWER TO ISSUES RAISED
IN CROSS-APPEAL
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(g), defendants hereby answer the points and
contentions raised by cross-appellant Dr. Jensen in his Corrected Appellee's Brief.
A.

The Trial Court Properly Declined to Award Reasonable Attorneys' Fees on
Non-Overlapping Claims.
Dr. Jensen asserts that he is entitled to attorneys' fees on his non-compensable

claims (defamation and false light) because, he contends, those claims overlap legally
and/or factually with his compensable statutory information-gathering claim. Corrected
Appellee's Br. at 46.
Prevailing parties may collect attorneys fees on non-compensable claims only
when those claims substantially overlap with compensable claims. See Keith
Jorgensen 's, Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co., 26 P.3d 872, 879 (Utah App. 2001). Claims
are deemed not to overlap if they require proof of different elements and sets of facts. Cf.
Brown v. DavidK. Richardson Co., Inc., 978 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1999). The question

For the Court's benefit, the appellants have appended to this brief the
transcripts of the phone conversation between Mary Sawyers and Dr. Jensen, prior to her
office visit, and of her hidden camera recording of her office visit with Dr. Jensen, to
further demonstrate that defendants had no reason to doubt the truth of their broadcasts.
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of whether a party is entitled to attorneys' fees is a question of law reviewed for
correctness. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1988).
The trial court correctly concluded that Dr. Jensen's claims arising from the
manner in which information was gathered shared neither a common core of facts nor
related legal theories with his claims for defamation and false light that are based on
falsity of the content of the broadcasts and defendants' care with respect to truth. See
R.6779 (Order July 31, 2001) at 5: 1-2. Dr. Jensen's invasion of privacy claims based
upon newsgathering claims are not "inextricably linked" with, and require different proof
than, the broadcast-based claims of defamation and false light. Compare R. 6841 Jury
Instructions Nos. 26-33 with Nos. 40-48. Because the claims did not substantially
overlap, the trial court was correct in concluding that Dr. Jensen was not entitled to
attorney's fees on his non-compensable claims.
B.

The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that Attorney Sine's Allocation of Fees
Was Deficient.
Dr. Jensen asserts that the District Court erred when it rejected Mr. Sine's request

for attorney's fees because he failed to properly allocate them. See R. 6776 (Ruling
September 27, 2001) at 8: 17-18.
A party who is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees on some claims but not others
must segregate the time and fees expended for (1) successful claims for which there may
be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there would have
been an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been successful, and (3) claims for
which there is no entitlement to attorney fees. See Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830
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P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992). A party who requests an award of attorney fees has the
burden of presenting evidence sufficient to support an award. See Cottonwood Mall Co.,
830 P.2d at 269-70.21 A trial court's determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See Bakowski v. Mountain States
Steel Inc., 52 P.3d 1179, 1188 (Utah 2002).
Here, Attorney Sine failed to comply with the allocation requirements, even when
ordered to do so by the trial court, and instead submitted a list of fees divided into two
columns. The trial court's conclusion that this submission did not comport with the
allocation standards was not an abuse of its discretion. See Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 318.
C.

The Trial Court Correctly Declined to Award All of Dr, Jensen's Claimed
Costs.
1.

The defendants complied with Rule 54(d)(2).

Dr. Jensen asserts that he should be awarded all of his claimed costs because the
defendants filed an "objection" rather than a "motion" opposing the costs claimed under
Rule 54(d)(2). See Corrected Appellee's Br. at 46. This Court has repeatedly and
consistently treated "objections" and "motions" synonymously. See Graco Fishing &
Rental Tools v. IronwoodExploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Utah 1987) (noting
that "objections to costs must be filed within seven days") (emphasis added); see also
Suniland Corp. v. Radcliffe, 576 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah 1978) ("The objection to the cost

A failure to allocate fees between compensable and non-compensable claims
"constitutes grounds for complete denial." Wilde v. Wilde, 35 P.3d 341, 349 (Utah App.
2001), cert, denied, 42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002); Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass 'n v. Cox, 627
P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981).
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bill was filed by [defendant]") (emphasis added). Accordingly, Dr. Jensen's claim that
defendants failed to comply with Rule 54(d)(2) should be rejected.
2.

The costs claimed by Dr. Jensen were properly rejected as not being
"necessary disbursements."

Dr. Jensen complains that the trial court failed to award him costs that are
authorized under neither Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2) nor this Court's
precedents. See Corrected Appellee's Br. at 47-48. Nevertheless, Dr. Jensen insists that
he should recover the costs of expert witness fees and equipment, among other expenses,
because they were "necessary." Id. A trial court's decision to award or deny taxable
costs will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616,
637 (Utah 2000).
Utah courts have interpreted "costs" recoverable under Rule 54(d) to mean "those
fees which are 'required to be paid to the court and to witnesses,'" see Lloyd's Unlimited
v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 512 (Utah App. 1988), and have
uniformly distinguished taxable costs from other litigation expenses, regardless of the
alleged "necessity" of those expenses. See Coleman v. Stevens, 17 P.3d 1122, 1125
(Utah 2000). As this Court noted in Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980),
and reaffirmed this year in Armed Forces Insurance Exchange v. Harrison, 70 P.3d 35,
46 (Utah 2003), "there is a distinction to be understood between legitimate and taxable
costs and other expenses of litigation which may be ever so necessary, but are not taxable
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as costs." The trial court's decision to adhere to the requirements of Utah law and allow
only those costs authorized by statute and case law was not an abuse of discretion.22
Nor is Dr. Jensen's assertion that the Frampton ruling violates the Open Courts
clause of the Utah Constitution well taken. See Corrected Appellee's Br. at 48. Dr.
Jensen asserts that a litigant is deprived of due process of law by the legislature's
determination that only statutorily-specified costs, rather than all conceivable expenses
incurred in litigation, may be recovered. See id. Article I, section 11 of the Utah
Constitution provides that all persons shall have reasonable access to the courts and shall
enjoy due process of law. See Jensen v. State Tax Comm 'n, 835 P.2d 965 (Utah 1992)
(concluding that where taxpayers were required to pay, but were unable to pay, as a
deposit the full amount of taxes assessed, penalties, and interest before seeking judicial
review, the open courts provision was violated, but noting that when a taxpayer is able to
pay the deposit, she must do so). In this case, Dr. Jensen "received a hearing with no
preconditions, obstacles, or other limitations." Burgandy v. State of Utah, 983 P.2d 586,
589 (Utah App. 1999), cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999). The potential that Dr.
Jensen would have to pay all or some his own costs did not impede or restrict "reasonable
access" to access the courts in violation of the Utah Constitution.

Dr. Jensen does not contend that the trial court abused its discretion, but urges
instead that Frampton was wrongly decided.
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D.

The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that the Three Separate Awards on Dr.
Jensen's Gathering of Information Claims Were Duplicative.
Dr. Jensen asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the damage awards on

the common law intrusion upon seclusion claim was duplicative of the two statutory
privacy claims. See Corrected Appellee's Br. at 48.
A jury verdict which awards duplicate damages based on the same conduct must
be vacated. See Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872, 881 (Utah 1985); Mason v.
Oklahoma Turnpike Autk, 115 F.3d 1442, 1459 (10th Cir. 1997). The question of
whether damage awards are duplicative is one of fact, reviewable under the clearly
erroneous standard. See Mason, 115 F.3d at 1459.
Here, the trial court determined that all three of Dr. Jensen's three invasion of
privacy claims arose "under the same operative facts and [sought] identical relief." See
R. 6781-82. The trial court reasoned that that the additional element of "trespass" found
in Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-402(1 )(a) did not sufficiently distinguish it from Utah Code
Ann. § 76-9-402(1 )(b) and the common law privacy claims because all three claims were
aimed at punishing the same conduct, viz. invasion of privacy by surreptitious recording
of Dr. Jensen's interaction with Sawyers.
Indeed, all three of the invasion of privacy (two statutory and one common law)
claims upon which Dr. Jensen prevailed were premised upon the identical set of facts.
See R. atfflf5-22, 23-25. Under these circumstances, the trial court's conclusion does not
amount to clear error. See Diversified Holdings, L.C. v. Turner, 63 P.3d 686, 699 (Utah
2002).
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Addendum 12

Jensen v. Sawyers and United Television
TRANSCRIPT
TAPE NO. 5
July

,1995

Telephone call - Mary Sawyers and Michael Jensen
Sawyers:

Is Michael Jensen there, please?

Receptionist:

He is not. He will be here at 6:00 o'clock.

Sawyers:

Oh, 6:00 tonight?

Receptionist:

Yes.

Sawyers:

Uh. Where would I reach him during the day?

Receptionist:

He works for us from 6 to 8 at night.

Sawyers:

Oh. Only for two hours? Is he busy that whole time?

Receptionist:

Uh. That depends. Did you need to come in, or?

Sawyers:

No. Actually I just need to talk to him. It was more of a
personal nature.

Receptionist:

Yeah. He'll be here til 6:00.

Sawyers:

Alright. Thank you.

Receptionist:

Uhhuh. Bye. Bye.
Dial tone.
Sound of numbers being dialed.

Sawyers:

This is Mary. Hello. Hello.
Dial tone.
Sound of numbers being dialed.

Busy signal.
Sawyers:

This is Mary.

Jensen:

Yes Mary. Hi, Dr. Jensen.

Sawyers:

Oh, hi. How are you.

Jensen:

Good.

Sawyers:

Thanks for calling me back. I'm sorry to be bothering you at
work. I tried a couple of times but that was the only number I
could find.

Jensen:

That's okay. That's fine.

Sawyers:

Uh. Geoff Roth, who is our new managing editor.

Jensen:

Uh huh.

Sawyers:

Told me you might be able to help me. I told him that I have been
on this diet lately and haven't been able to lose much weight.

Jensen:

Uhhuh.

Sawyers:

And he said that you prescribed some pills for one of his friends.
Some, I don't know what they are, some diet pills.

Jensen:

Uhhuh.

Sawyers:

Could you do that for me?

Jensen:

Yeah. I probably could.

Sawyers:

Okay.

Jensen:

So, uh.

Sawyers:

What do you need to know?

Jensen:

Uh. To prescribe something like that, I would prefer to see you as
a patient.
Uhhuh.

Jensen:

Is that something you could arrange very easily?

Sawyers:

Uh. Well, I don't know. It depends on my insurance. What kind
of insurance do you use?

Jensen:

Okay. I'm covered with almost every plan there is.

Sawyers:

IHC Care?

Jensen:

Yup.

Sawyers:

Okay.

Jensen:

In fact, I'm probably. That's probably the main insurance that is
covered through me.

Sawyers:

Do you have another. Are you at another? Do you have your
own practice besides this uh?

Jensen:

Uh. Actually I will be in about ten days. I have been —. I have
had an injury and been hospitalized.

Sawyers:

Uh.

Jensen:

And, uh, but, uh, actually I'm the guy to talk about weight loss.

Sawyer s.-

Okay.

Jensen:

I know a lot about it. I ran the OptiFast program here at Utah
Valley for about three years and also many physicians are
reluctant to prescribe prescription diet pills. I really am not. I
think they work. Laughs. I think they work great.

Sawyers:

Uh huh.

Jensen:

So,uh.

Sawyers:

What is it that you prescribe?

Jensen:

Uh. Right now what is used most is Fastin and something
called Pondimin.

ers:

Uhhuh.

Jensen:

Traditionally what has been used is Dexedrine. Dexedrine
technically is illegal to, uh, use as a diet pill. Though I, uh, sometimes
I find people have other disorders that I uh feel comfortable using
Dexedrine with.

Sawyers:

Uh huh.

Jensen:

All of these medications are related. They are technically
amphetamines which are speed.

Sawyers:

Uh huh.

Jensen:

Uh. And if used properly I don't find them dangerous or addicting.
So.

Sawyers:

So Fastin and this other thing are similar?

Jensen:

Yes, they are.

Sawyers:

So, its, its basically like taking speed?

Jensen:

That's correct.

Sawyers:
Jensen:

Sawyers:

But you don't think its harmful?
Not, not if it is taken properly. Uh. I suggest patients, uh, take,
uh, not take a pill one day out of the week and that way they
don't develop a tolerance to that. Uh. I took Fastin for one
month, uh, and I took it each day and I went through a withdrawal
that lasted about a day and a half which was semi unpleasant but
it wasn't that bad.
Um.

Jensen:

Uh, but, uh, I don't think these things are highly addictive
particularly if you, if you kind of give yourself a break one day a
week. But they really work.

Sawyers:

How, I mean, I don't need to lose a lot of weight. I would, just
like 10 pounds mainly.

Jensen:

Sawyers:

Jensen:

Uh. Then you would be a perfect candidate. Uh. For example,
I have a friend who just got off a mission who, who is usually a
really thin, you know, college type girl, and she picked up, oh
probably an extra 20 pounds on her mission and I have had her
on, uh actually on Dexedrine for about a month and a half and she
is down to her ideal weight. And it's, it happened oh over about
a month a half. Most people lose somewhere between 10 and 20
pounds a month on these medicines.
So, is there a time, I mean you can't take them only for a certain
amount of time. Do they become harmful if you take them for a
longer period of time?
Uh, not necessarily. Uh. Legally its been. Uh the FDA has uh or
the DEA, I'm not sure who has made it so that Fastin and
Pondimin can only be prescribed three months out of the year.
Uh. So, if somebody had a different disorder, for example,
attention deficit disorder which is hyperactivity, uh which is seen
in children, or narcolepsy, people falling asleep at the wheel or just
difficulty with staying awake, uh, I'll prescribe longer than that.
But, as a physician, you really got to be able to document uh why
you are prescribing these things. Because, they, they are actually
class two substances which are the highest controlled substance
there is.

Sawyers:

So, you can't prescribe them for longer than that amount of time
if you are prescribing them for somebody to lose weight?

Jensen:

That's right. Now one thing I haven't checked out uh is there are
about five different kinds of these medications on the market and
whether you can go from one to the other. And I can give a
pharmacist a call and uh do that. But if you only want to lose 10
pounds, that's easy.

Sawyers:

Uhhuh.

Jensen:

I can tell you right now.

Sawyers:

So, you think I could do that in how long?

Jensen:

I think you could do it in one month.

Sawyers:

Oh, really.

Jensen:

Yup.

Sawyers:

And you think that I could keep it off?

Jensen:

Uh. I have found that people that go on these medications, what
it does is suppresses your appetite so much that you don't even
want to eat and, uh, during that time period basically you develop
a regimen that you get used to and, uh, and if it is properly done,
yes, you keep the weight off.

Sawyers:

So, I thought Geoff said that you prescribed some for his friend.
You ~. Is she a patient of yours? I mean, I need to come in for
a visit?

Jensen:

Yes. Actually these medications because they are so highly
controlled, it is something that I can't even call in. I have to write
it out.

Sawyers:

Uhhuh.

Jensen:
Sawyers:
Jensen:
Sawyers:

On a script. So, uh.
So she's a patient of yours too?
Yeah. I'm not sure who, who we are, who we are talking about.
It was some party. He just said uh I met this doctor at a party.
I think his friend's named Lisa and he said uh that he was either
told or he was there when you, you know, prescribed some diet
pills and he says, I don't know, you know, what if he could
prescribe them to you over the phone.

Jensen:

Yeah. I know who that is then. Uh5 it was Lisa Johnson who
wrote How to Date a Millionaire,

Sawyers:

Oh.

Jensen:

Laughter. So, uh.

Sawyers:

So, she's one of your patients, too?

Jensen:

Uh. She's actually a longtime friend of mine. Ijust happened to
be at that party. So, uh.

Sawyers:

But you couldn't prescribe then for me without coming in?

Jensen:

Uh. I really prefer, uh, it would be considered very bad medicine
for me to prescribe an amphetamine over the phone. Even, you
know, I realize it would be inconvenient for you.

Sawyers:

Right. I could probably.

Jensen:

I think it would be worth it for you.

Sawyers:

Okay. So, you know, would it be better then if I come to your
practice? I mean, or.

Jensen:

Uh. You, what would probably, and I don't know what your work
hours are and stuff like that but presently I am working just from
6:00 to 8:00 nearly every day.

Sawyers:

Uhhuh.

Jensen:

At this clinic that you called. Uh, I will be starting at my new
practice next week and will be working uh Thursday, Friday and
Monday.

Sawyers:

Uhhuh.

Jensen:

And just depending. Those will be regular hours. Those are like
9 to 5 hours when these others are —. Uh. I am also working a
12 hour day Thursday at this clinic.

Sawyers:

Uhhuh.

Jensen:

And that will be from 8 to 8.

Sawyers:

Okay, but you're down, that's down south, isn't it, where?

Jensen:

Yes.

Sawyers:

Where are you at?

Jensen:

Yes. Uh. The clinic that you called is actually called First Med
and it is on 8th North in Orem. That's the same road the Osmond
Studio is on.

Sawyers:

Okay. Let me do this. Let me look at my, because I am getting
ready for a series here, let me look at my schedule and then see
when I could get in. Uh, and then, uh, just call and make an
appointment at this 224 number?

Jensen:

Um. I think that would be probably best for you.

Sawyers:

Okay. I need to see . . .

Jensen:

I am making a transition right now and you will find me hard to
get besides at this clinic.

Sawyers:

Uh huh. I'll see if I can get, I need to see if I can get a referral
from my primary care physician too.

Jensen:

Okay.

Sawyers:

I'll do that and then I'll give you a call back.

Jensen:

Okay. Great

Sawyers:

Okay. Thank's a lot.

Jensen:

Bye.
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Jensen:

I'm Dr. Jensen.

Sawyers:

I'm M a r y Sawyers.
(Pause in tape).
Knock on door.

Jensen:

Hello. I'm Dr. Jensen.

Sawyers:

I'm Mary Sawyers. We talked on the phone. Nice to meet y o u .

Jensen:

Well.

Sawyers:

So, t h a t ' s w h a t y o u did to you?

Jensen:

Yeah. I broke
there a certain
that you w a n t
y o u on w h a t ' s

Sawyers:

I just w a n t t h e safest, easiest w a y to lose w e i g h t .

Jensen:

Okay. U h . Let me tell you w h a t the current thinking is right n o w .
Uh. W h a t is used and these are technically appetite suppressants,
but t h e y ' r e related to uh speed, w h i c h is an amphetamine, and
t h e y really suppress your appetite. I have taken it before and I'm
pretty lean and I lose weight Taking stuff iike m a t . Uh. Dexednne
uh and Ritalin are t w o things that. M o s t people have heard o f
Ritalin.

Sawyers:

Yes. They give it to hyperactive kids, d o n ' t they?

m y achilles tendon right in half so. Uh. Mary, is
thing that you k n o w , have heard of, or whatever
to do with this or do you w a n t me to just school
available?
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Jensen:

Uh huh. A n d these medications are sister drugs to those. The
ones t h a t are approved for weight loss right n o w are Fastin and
currently one thing that is sort or the vogue thing right n o w is t o
use Fastin and Pondimin which they are t w o sister drugs, but
Fastin is a long acting medication y o u take one time a day.
Pondimin people will take three times a day just before meals.
Pondimin is a little unusual in that it is supposed t o be a stimulant
but w h e n taken w i t h Fastin it actually uh suppresses. You are
kind of hyperactive affects.

Sawyers:

So, they take t h e m together.

Jensen:

W h a t y o u . Yes, you do. And I, and I h a v e n ' t done it, I'm just
familiar w i t h it. This is w h a t you will read in. Apparently there is
a Readers Digest article recently. But a lot of people will, are
talking about it. And its something t h a t ' s been recently quite
publicized as being highly effective. N o w , if y o u are a person that
has relatively good control and just needs a little bit of a push, I
w o u l d suggest just going on Fastin. I could give y o u an additional
prescription for Pondimin if you w a n t if things are not w o r k i n g .

Sawyers:

Try one and then see.

Jensen:

Uh h u h . I think you can increase or double or triple your chances
of side effects if you take both of t h e m at once. One of our
nurses in the clinic was doing that and it just d i d n ' t w o r k . She
d i d n ' t feel right. Now, I have taken Fastin before and uh I feel
okay. I d o n ' t k n o w if you are much of a caffeine user but I think
y o u get similar side effects as caffeine using Fastin. Okay. Uh.
If Fastin d i d n ' t w o r k for y o u , I w o u l d be willing to w o r k w i t h you
uh maybe using Dexedrine. It is technically not legal for that
reason.

Sawyers:

For w e i g h t loss?

Jensen:

Right. Dexedrine is used for attention deficit disorder. In other
w o r d s maintaining concentration. I took Ritalin for my boards.
You can concentrate . . .
One, t w o , three four. (Other background voices).
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Jensen:

The other one is narcolepsy. People fall asleep at the wheel. So
those are the legal reasons to use those medicines. I don't.
(Background noise)

Jensen:

I have quite a few adults with attention deficit disorder
(background voice) on Dexedrine and I haven't run into a problem
once with drug addiction.

Sawyers:

So, what, do you just put down attention deficit disorder?

Jensen:

I usually, usually put narcolepsy in an adult. We all deal with
fatigue and tiredness, and you can just say I am tired.

Sawyers:

But the Dexedrine you wouldn't suggest before I tried the other
stuff.

Jensen:

Uh. Going with Fastin is in essence a cleaner way. Its approved
for weight loss. Its a sister drug to Dexedrine and, uh.

Sawyers:

Is it speed as well?

Jensen:

Uh huh.

Sawyers:

So, which is an amphetamine, right?

Jensen:

Yes. They are all amphetamines.

Sawyers:

So, are they the same things that you buy like in the store, just.

Jensen:

Not technically. The ones that you buy in the store are actually
sort of a hybrid. They're, the caffeine is in a group in and of itself
and they are more related to caffeine. Uh.

Sawyers:

These are just more powerful?

Jensen:

Considerably.

Sawyers:

So you don't think it can be harmful?

I would say five to ten times more powerful.
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Jensen:

Uh. I suggest t h a t people not take one once a week. U h . I took
Fastin for a m o n t h once and then just stopped and I w e n t t h r o u g h
some withdrawals for about a day and a half. I d i d n ' t feel g o o d .
Uh. But it d i d n ' t last very long. But there w a s no question that.
A n d one thing t h a t you'll find, you probably, w e l l , uh, y o u almost
certainly lead a really rigorous life style a n d .

Sawyers:

I never k n o w w h e n I'm going to be w o r k i n g .

Jensen:

Yeah. A n d it's tempting for somebody w i t h t h a t , y o u k n o w , kind
of a drive to use these as a stimulant.

Sawyers:

Uh huh.

Jensen:

You'll have tremendous energy when y o u take these. So, w h i c h
is great.

Sawyers:

So if I have to stay up all night and cut a series. That's w h y I w a s
d o w n here. I w a s d o w n in Springville shooting for a child abuse
series.

Jensen:

Uh. Uh. But t h a t ' s w h a t I would suggest. I will w r i t e you a
prescription for Fastin and the other thing I like about this is I can
give you t w o refills w i t h each of these. I am giving y o u a three
m o n t h supply right n o w . Dexedrine I c a n ' t do that w i t h . I have
t o give it to y o u each m o n t h .

Sawyers:

Okay.

Jensen:

Okay. But, u h , like I said, if this isn't w o r k i n g for y o u , uh, I'll
w o r k w i t h y o u a little bit and w i t h other things. Uh. Is there
anything as far as eating, things like that?

Sawyers:

I like it.

Jensen:

Okay. Uh. W h a t w e ' l l . There are other things y o u can do. Uh.
Medically I think w e have big armament for w e i g h t loss right n o w
t h a t we d i d n ' t have in the past.

Sawyers:

I read about something or I heard something on the air today
about rats and its a n e w drug they are injecting in rats for obesity.
Did you hear about that?

Jensen:

No.

Laughs.
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Sawyers:

No.

Jensen:

It seems funny people often hear these things before I do.

Sawyers:

Well, it is something that they are injecting into rats and they were
losing like thirty percent of their body weight.

Jensen:

Oh, really. I'm not sure. Well, uh, where was it listed?

So.

Where

did you find your information?
Sawyers:

Uh, National Public Radio. On the radio.

Jensen:

So, the radio.

Sawyers:

I think it came out of Science, one of those journals.

Jensen:

Hum. Yes, Science is kind of a lay journal. It is not really a
medical journal, but, its like Popular Mechanics.
But hold on.
So, then once you lose, you've lost your desired weight, then you
can, I mean, what, does it suppress your appetite even after that?

Sawyers:

Jensen:

What it does, uh. You don't want to eat. You actually have to
think, I mean, you eat, you know, just to stay healthy. And by
the time you reach the three month period, and you may choose
to go on, on an interval where you don't take it for a month in
between. But you will have the prescription on hand. Uh. But
this is the time to actually uh have eating habits and form patterns
that are lasting. Okay. I'll go over some of those.

Sawyers:

This is real interesting. Really. I mean I, you hear about all these
weight loss programs. I went on Jenny Craig last year.

Jensen:

Uh huh.

Sawyers:

I lost some weight but I started to gain most of it back. If these
work, maybe I should. Didn't you say that you helped a woman
lose like thirty pounds, or some BYU person.

Jensen:

Oh, yeah. Yeah.

Sawyers:

Sounds like an interesting story. If they work, I should do a story.
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Jensen:

Uh. But someone like you is a perfect candidate for this. Okay.
Uh. People can lose somewhere between ten and twenty pounds
a month and, you know, you can get really lean with this. And,
uh.

Sawyers:

Can you lose too much weight, though? I mean, not that I would
be worried about, you know, I mean, I think I.

Jensen:

Well, you could be if you were thinking in anorexic ways.

But

probably not.
Sawyers:

You just stop taking them when you get to your correct weight.

Jensen:

Yeah. Uh.

Sawyers:

So these are just the one a day?

Jensen:

Uh hum. And this is what I would suggest you starting with. Uh.
I'm a little bit concerned that you function properly. Okay.
Yeah. I do want.

Sawyers:
Jensen:

So. Uh. It suggests these need to be taken late morning. I think
you can gauge when you take them. I would start out initially at
say eight o'clock. I'd eat a little bit of food with it because I think
it can upset your stomach a little bit. Uh. And you can tell when
these wear off. With me, they wear off right about eight o'clock
and I just like my battery had run out.

Sawyers:

Uh huh. You mean eight o'clock in the morning. Take it at eight
o'clock in the morning.

Jensen:

Yeah. About eight o'clock at night is when I would notice this,
this feeling, okay.

Sawyers:

Oh. Okay.
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Jensen:

Okay. I need to tell this to you just because I think it may be an
issue with your work. But, the, the time capsule itself is like a
Contact time capsule and say it ran out and you were in the
middle of something and this is like ruining things. You can
actually take a small amount of the capsule and bite it and at that
moment you get that effect. It is technically a way of abusing
these, okay. Uh. And it could be dangerous if you bit an entire
capsule. Okay. But it is one way of breaking that time release
form of it. Grinding it on your teeth

Sawyers:

You don't automatically have.

Jensen:

Yeah.

Sawyers:

Okay. That could be a problem.

Jensen:

Yes. Because normally what I did in the morning, I would take it.
I would grind some of that. I would wake right up and just go.
You know, and I actually threw my last prescription away just
because of the way I live. The way I think. I'm just compulsive.
And you stop, you know, this isn't good for me right now. I'm
not really uh losing more weight than I want to and this is giving
me energy. I'm just going to abuse.

Sawyers:

So, if I start to crash, just take a pill and bite on it?

Jensen:

You would actually take the capsule, open it up, and then put just
a. You can sometimes go like that.

Sawyers:

Oh. The granules, pebbles, okay.

Jensen:

You can just bite them. Ideally you wouldn't get in a situation
where you need to do that. You could take caffeine on top of this
if you needed to. Okay.

Sawyers:

Well, hopefully I could figure out a schedule that won't.

Jensen:

Yes.

Sawyers:

You think in the morning is better.

Jensen:

Uh. It's suggested that these be taken at about ten o'clock
usually.
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Sawyers:

Oh.

Jensen:

But that's not when I took them. I would take them at about
eight. Uh. (Pause). These come in a uh generic form and I would
suggest getting a brand name.

Sawyers:

It is that much different?

Jensen:

Uh. In this case I think it is. Okay. And I need to look up
Pondimin because that is just not something that I use a lot. To
get everything straight.

Sawyers:

Fastin is, that's what the doctors use it for is for weight loss?

Jensen:

Yeah. That's what it is made for.
(Long pause in tape).

Jensen:

Uh. Do you know how these things have worked for Lisa?

Sawyers:

I don't. I don't know. I haven't asked Geoff. I should ask him.
I only met her once. She doesn't look like she needs to lose much
weight to me, but.

Jensen:

Uh. In the hips. She is a little hip heavy. She dresses right.
(Pause). Pondimin is difficult to find right now. Fastin, probably
not. Uh. You can find Pondimin. If you choose to fill the
Pondimin, I'd give yourself ten days at least before you.

Sawyers:

So. Then if I fill this one, I take it in combination.

Jensen:

Yes.

Sawyers:

Just once a day.

Jensen:

Interestingly, legally you take both of these in combination for
three months which I think is pretty generous by the DEA. So.
Uh. Its been approved and so uh.

Sawyers:

So, its the same, its just a different kind of amphetamine.

Jensen:

Yes. Uh. One way of thinking about it is like uh Ibuprofen,
Naproxin, Naprosin are sister drugs. They are related to aspirin.
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Sawyers:

Just some work better for different people or something?

Jensen:

Uh hum.

Pondimin is sugar acting. This is a long acting
. These are tablets. So these will only work say
maybe two to four hours. Let's see what the half life is. Twenty
hours it says. Uh. Let's see. Uh. That's a metabolize two to
four hours. So. Uh. You know, average it out to three hours.
So.
(Pause).
(Tape ends).
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